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FEDERAL APPELLATE JUSTICE IN 1973*
Roger C. Cramtont

Two of the nation's leading jurists and two of its outstanding
law professors discussed the quality and structure of federal appellate justice in the 1973 four-part Irvine Lecture Series at the
Cornell Law School. The series contributed to a growing public
discussion of the problems encountered as federal appellate courts,
including the Supreme Court, have faced mounting workloads.
The four lecturers were Professor Maurice Rosenberg of the Columbia University Law School, Judge Clement F. Haynsworth of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Professor Philip B. Kurland of the University of Chicago Law School, and
Judge Henry J. Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.
The backdrop for the series was the increasing difficulty that
appellate courts have had in handling the flood of appeals in recent
years. Within the last decade, the number of appellate cases in the
federal courts alone has risen from about 5,000 to 15,000 per year.
A more affluent and larger population has committed many new
and complex issues to the courts such as civil, environmental, and
consumer rights cases. Moreover, the number and proportion of
criminal appeals has risen at an explosive rate. The increased case
load has required federal appellate judges not only to increase
their individual output, but to adopt various screening and other
procedural devices in order to stay abreast of the tide. Delay has
* The Board of Editors of the Cornell Law Review wishes to express its appreciation to

two of its members, Thomas E. Myers and Archie T. Wright, III, for their assistance in the
preparation of the following Articles.
t Dean of the Law School Faculty and Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B. 1950,
Harvard University; J.D. 1955, University of Chicago. Member, Commission on Revision of
the Federal Court Appellate System.
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nevertheless increased and these valiant efforts may themselves
have affected the quality of the appellate process.
The four lecturers in the series agree that the federal courts of
appeals and the Supreme Court are faced with massive and growing workloads that cannot be handled adequately by present manpower and techniques under existing jurisdictional rules. There is
agreement that a major current problem is undue delay in the
disposition of appeals. The time required for disposition of civil
appeals has grown to nearly two years in several courts of appeals.
Although the record is better in criminal cases, growing backlogs
and resultant delays are being encountered here also. The purposes of the legal system are hampered and a litigant's right to
appeal threatened by such undue delay.
A second and widely shared concern involves the quality of the
decisional process as the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court
adopt assembly-line techniques to deal with massive case loads.
Oral argument has been reduced in most courts and eliminated
entirely in a large portion of cases in some jurisdictions. The
growth of court personnel engaged in screening and analyzing
cases has given rise to fears that the judicial process is being
bureaucratized, with the consequent loss of the element of personal
decision that traditionally has characterized the Anglo-American
judicial process. The commendable efforts of the courts to expedite
decision and increase court productivity, some fear, may have
affected the quality of the decisional process. Thus, Professor
Kurland spoke of the inability of the Supreme Court Justices to set
aside adequate time for reflection, personal research, and collegial
exchange on the difficult issues before the Court.
A third major concern involves the current methods of handling criminal appeals and prisoner petitions challenging state and
federal convictions. Finality and dispatch in criminal cases have
been bled out of the federal appellate process, resulting in a large,
repetitive, and often frivolous body of appeals crowding the dockets. Several alternative methods of dealing with the problem are
advanced. Judge Haynsworth, whose lecture concentrates on this
issue, proposes a new national tribunal which would provide each
criminal defendant with a single, direct opportunity to raise federal
constitutional questions, thus eliminating these cases from lower
federal courts and the Supreme Court. Judge Friendly, on the
other hand, opposes the Haynsworth remedy as unnecessary and
undesirable, arguing that various statutory proposals to rein-
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troduce finality to criminal decisions would accomplish the same
purpose in a better fashion.
There is dispute concerning the significance of a fourth
problem-lack of stability and evenhandedness in federal law.
Professor Rosenberg argues that the growth in the size of the
federal courts of appeals, which have as many as fifteen appellate
judges on a single court, and the inability of the Supreme Court to
resolve all of the conflicting decisions of lower courts because of
time pressure, have resulted in uncertainty, instability, and a lack of
uniformity of federal law. Litigants are treated differently by
different panels of the same courts of appeals and by courts of
appeals sitting in different parts of the country. Uncertainty concerning important questions of law also encourages relitigation of
the same question in different courts and increases the burdens at
all court levels by generating a continuous flow of new lawsuits
throughout the country. Professor Rosenberg and Judge Haynsworth conclude that the increasing instability of federal law warrants major structural revisions of the federal appellate system,
including the creation of a new tribunal under the Supreme Court.
Judge Friendly, on the other hand, while agreeing that the Supreme Court is unable to resolve all intercircuit conflicts, concludes
that structural revision would not accomplish the purposes sought
and is objectionable because it would create specialized tribunals
and result in jurisdictional bickering between the new court and
existing courts.
The principal focus of the series is on finding solutions for
these vexing and complicated problems. If a system is overtaxed
with a workload that it cannot handle adequately, solutions must be
found either in reducing the input into the system, increasing its
productivity, or revising its structure in a way that contributes to
reduced case load or increased capacity. Solutions of all three kinds
are discussed by the lecturers.
Judge Friendly is alone in placing sole reliance on proposals to
reduce the case load of the overburdened appellate courts. "There
is only one way," he said, "to avert the flood, namely, to lessen the
flow of cases into the general federal courts by eliminating those
that should not be there."
His suggestions include elimination of diversity jurisdiction,
limitation of the use of the federal criminal process, containment of
tax and patent litigation within specialized systems except to resolve
constitutional issues, and severe curtailment of executive branch
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dependency upon the federal courts by increasing the fact-finding
and enforcement powers of departments and agencies.
Each of the four lecturers expresses concern over the effects of
recent procedural and staffing developments in the federal courts
on the quality of appellate decisions, but no sharply focused recommendations emerge. Faced with a crushing workload and desirous of preventing undue delay, the federal appellate courts have
resorted to screening procedures that utilize law clerks and other
court personnel to winnow out frivolous cases from those deserving
of more serious attention. Judge Haynsworth defends the use of
these techniques of summary disposition as infinitely superior to
prolonged delay in all cases. But the lectures do not deal with
arguments made with increasing frequency by members of the bar
that the courts may not be unerring in their identification of
frivolous cases for summary decision and that reliance on screening
by a single judge or his law clerk, if oral argument is denied, may
result in an effective delegation of decisional authority.
Proposals for structural revision of the federal appellate court
system are a principal focus of the lectures by Professor Rosenberg
and Judges Haynsworth and Friendly. Professor Rosenberg, who is
Chairman of the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, has developed, with Professor' Paul D. Carrington of the University of
Michigan Law School, an elaborate proposal for a national division
of the federal courts of appeals, which would provide relief both to
the circuit courts and the Supreme Court. The new tribunal, which
would be composed of judges selected from active circuit judges,
would handle types of cases which the Supreme Court, by rule,
would prescribe from categories delineated by Congress. Access to
the Supreme Court would not be cut off or turned over to the new
tribunal, and to the extent possible it would not be structured as a
new "fourth tier," with the delay in individual cases that any
elongation of the judicial structure would entail. Professor Rosenberg proposes that panels of the new national court deal with
claims against the United States, customs and patent appeals,
national law specialties such as federal income taxation, conflicts
between the circuits, criminal cases in which federal rights were
asserted, and perhaps other categories of cases. Judge Haynsworth
emphasizes the role of a new national tribunal in providing finality
in criminal cases, especially those in which a state criminal conviction or incarceration is under attack, but agrees with Professor
Rosenberg that inclusion of other categories of cases, such as
intercircuit conflicts, would be desirable.
Judge Friendly, on the other hand, opposes "tinkering at the
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appellate level" as inappropriate and ineffective. He argues that
Judge Haynsworth's proposal would create a specialized court of
criminal appeals which would be "dominated by hard-liners or
soft-liners, more likely the former," and which might come into
conflict with the Supreme Court's attitudes in the field of constitutional criminal procedure. He also attacks the RosenbergCarrington proposal on grounds that it "does nothing to curtail the
flow of cases" into the system and would create new problems of
jurisdiction and staffing while providing insufficient relief to the
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. Elimination of various
categories of cases from the federal courts entirely, in the view of
Judge Friendly, would benefit the federal courts at all levels without the creation of new problems.
In January 1974, the Advisory Council of Appellate Justice
adopted a modified form of the Rosenberg-Carrington proposal;
and in February, the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association adopted a recommendation calling for the
creation by Congress of a national division of the United States
Court of Appeals for the purposes of (1) affording relief to the
individual circuit courts of appeals, (2) affording relief to the
Supreme Court of the United States, (3) affording prompt resolution of legal issues of national concern which the Supreme
Court lacks the time to deal with, and (4) promptly eliminating
conflicts in the decisions by federal courts below the level of the
Supreme Court.
Both the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice and the American
Bar Association addressed their recommendations to the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, a new
federal commission which is charged by Congress with the development of recommendations for improvement in the structure
and procedure of the federal appellate court system.
The 1973 Irvine Lecture Series contributes substantially to
public discussion of issues of the structure and quality of federal
appellate justice. Prior to the lectures the report of a distinguished
group appointed by Chief Justice Burger and led by Professor Paul
A. Freund had recommended the creation of a new tribunal which
would provide relief to the Supreme Court. This report, which was
criticized by bar groups and by the Irvine lecturers, did not address
itself to congestion in the courts of appeals and the possible need
for earlier resolution of intercircuit conflicts and of other important questions of federal law. The Irvine lecturers make this
broader inquiry of problems and possible solutions, and have
contributed to the continuing debate on this subject.

PLANNED FLEXIBILITY TO MEET
CHANGING NEEDS OF THE
FEDERAL APPELLATE
SYSTEM*
Maurice Rosenbergt
From time to time in past years we have had rashes of scare
stories about the earth being overrun by giant ants, midget Martians, or other visitors who will arrive by saucer. While one ought
not be overly casual about such dire prospects, I remain confident
that if any of those types set foot-or whatever-on the planet,
we'll send them packing, saucers and all. I'm even confident that
despite the mushrooming population, radioactive clouds, and
everyday pollutants, we'll somehow come through with potable
water and breathable air.
The fear that haunts me with a hopeless obstinacy is a nightmare that would cause every lawyer or law student to quake. It is
that one morning we will look out the window and see nothing but
Federal Reporters rising from the earth to the heavens, shelves and
shelves of them, stretching from one horizon to the other. And if
the F.2d's can't take over by themselves, they will bring up
reinforcements-the N.Y. Supp. 2d's and the emerging third generation of the reporter series.
The rate at which appellate -courts are disgorging published
opinions is overwhelming, and it shows no sign of slackening. To
be quite fair, this is not the West Publishing Company's fault, or
even the judges'. The reason the courts turn out the enormous
volumes of opinions they do is that they must decide ever more
mountainous volumes of appeals. Naturally, the federal courts are
in the thick of this problem, as they are in most other sectors of
American life; if anything, .more so, for the federal courts have
been experiencing the shock waves of the litigation explosion more
than any other branch of the judicial system.
In conceiving and arranging a series of lectules devoted to
* This Article was delivered as part of the fifty-sixth Frank Irvine Lecture Series at the
Cornell Law School on October 8, 1973.
t Harold R. Medina Professor of Procedural Jurisprudence, Columbia University;
Chairman, Advisory Council for Appellate Justice. A.B., 1940, Syracuse University; LL.B.,
1947, Columbia University.
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federal appellate justice, Dean Roger Cramton has drawn attention
to this critical problem at precisely the right juncture. Now is the
time to find a way of either damming the tide of appeals the
federal appellate courts have been receiving, or of devising alternative measures to deal With the controversies that generate the
appeals. If we do not, the consequences will be most grave. For one
thing, the federal judicial system will probably lose some of its
capacity to serve as the major instrument for responsive and
responsible change in our society, a role it has filled for a generation with mainly good results. That would be a calamity.
In succeeding lectures you will be hearing Chief Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Professor Philip Kurland, and Judge Henry J.
Friendly describe the multitude of problems and ills that beset the
federal appellate court system. They will also of course be offering
their prescriptions for palliation or possible cure of these abundant
ills. My immodest purpose here is similar.
However, I am not under any illusion that the measures I shall
discuss are likely to be a "cure." My actual purpose is to suggest a
new strategy or approach to the problems and pathologies of the
system. For when one starts working to improve the administration
ofjustice, one soon learns that the diseases develop immunities and
spin off new strains faster than the reformers can count them, let
alone cure them. Correspondingly, zealous reformers are prone to
multiply remedies faster than the patients can absorb them. Happily, the three speakers who will follow me at this podium will offer
several of the best and most promising remedies yet advanced.
Chief Judge Haynsworth has produced a very thoughtful
proposal to meet the problem in its largest manifestation-the
flooding of the federal courts by thousands of collateral attacks on
criminal convictions that in the main were rendered by state courts.
He suggests creating a new tribunal, just below the Supreme Court,
to make final decisions in appeals raising collateral issues, and also
in those dealing with prisoners' complaints of illegal treatment in
custody.
Then comes Professor Kurland, whose lecture title suggests
that he will train his thoughts on the need to change the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court itself. He will doubtless
examine the plan (which I believe he supports) to have the Supreme Court devote itself entirely to functioning as a continuing
constitutional convention. This would mean the high Court would
forego deciding disputes involving the application of national statutes and the review of actions by regulatory agencies. The Court's
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fare would be a diet of constitutional questions, presumably with
some other tribunal or tribunals deciding the nonconstitutional
issues of national law.
Former Chief Judge Friendly has developed a thorough, brilliantly articulated, overall plan designed to improve the lot of the
entire federal judicial system including, of course, the courts of
appeals. His basic idea is to divert the diversity cases from the
federal courts, along with a substantial volume of other classes of
disputes. In addition, he proposes creating specialized courts to
dispose of esoteric types of controversies the United States Courts
of Appeals now digest at a considerable cost in juridical dyspepsia.
While each of those programs is imaginative and insightful,
each raises for me its own set of problems. Yet it would hardly be
fair to attack these brain children prenatally, en totes ses pbres.
Except for a passing comment, I shall therefore leave their presentation to their authors and their challenge to you.
My sole observation about them is that none builds in the
essential element that transcends all particulars: flexibility. To work
effectively, a sound plan must make allowance for adaptability to
changed circumstances that will surely come. Recent history teaches
that the most predictable characteristic of the workload of the
federal judicial system has been the certainty of kaleidoscopic
changes. These require rapid and flexible responsiveness. The
ideas I shall now outline stress that feature.
Professor Paul D. Carrington of Michigan has had either the
dominant or a major part in the development and refinement of
these thoughts. Other members of the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice, particularly Judges Shirley M. Hufstedler of the Ninth
Circuit and Harold Leventhal of the District of Columbia Circuit,
have been immensely helpful in their comments and criticisms. Of
course, those generous friends deserve no blame for any statements I utter.
I
THE FLOOD OF APPEALS

A survey of federal appellate justice over the past two decades
or so reveals several features that are almost too well-known to
require elaboration.
First is the massive upward surge in the volume of cases. This
reflects the explosion. of suit-filings in the district courts; but the
problem is not adequately portrayed by merely the figures on
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district court entries. One bleak datum giving added dimension to
the problem is that the number of filings in the eleven circuits of
the United States Court of Appeals increased in the seven-year
period from 1966 to 1973 like the price of potatoes-117.6
percent.' Judge John Minor Wisdom has forecast that in seven
more years-that is, by 1980-we will have at least a doubling of
last year's federal appellate intake of 15,629 appeals.2 He has
testified before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System that by the end of this decade, the courts of
appeals will enjoy-if that is the word-a boom that will raise their
3
load to a level between 30,000 and 40,000 cases.
Second, there has been a significant change in the composition
or mix of the case load. It has tended over time to be made up of a
greater share of suits that~consume large amounts of judicial time
and energy. A markedly higher percentage of criminal suits is
producing a higher percentage of appeals. Civil suits of great
durability are growing more common and more complicated. From
a sociopolitical perspective, the cases have increasingly involved
wider, deeper stakes than in the past. Increasingly, they represent
collisions of strongly held social attitudes involving large constituencies. Proportionately fewer are the politically bland disputes
over narrow private interests. More and more of them are, in the
4
vernacular, federal cases.
Another change is that more and more appeals are brought
without the appellant's calculating whether pressing ahead makes
sense in terms of the dollar costs. With rising frequency, decisions
to appeal disregard money considerations. Often indigent litigants
do not have to pay the costs, win or lose; and even when they do,
they seem to be more concerned with winning thai with net
economic advantage. The end result is a dramatically disproportionate surge in the practice of appealing, and it is epitomized by
I

Percentage computed from DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED

II-1 (Table 1) (Preliminary FY 1973).
John Minor Wisdom, submitted to Commission on the
Revision of the Federal Appellate System, August 22, 1973 (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
3 Id. My colleague Herbert Wechsler, who is also a member of the Federal Commission
on which Dean Cramton sits, has indicated in our conversations that he does not endorse this
gloomy assessment. He has suggested that various changes in federal law-for instance, the
ending of the military draft-will tend to flatten the steep upward climb in the volume of
federal appellate case population. He foresees little further increase in the coming decade.
4 For example, the system of financing public education through local property tax
revenues has presented the courts with extremely delicate and complex issues riddled with
basic conflicts in economic and human values. See, e.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT
2 Statement of Circuit Judge
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these figures: from 1960 to this year, district court case volume
increased about 60 percent; 5 in the same period, appellate filings
went up about 270 percent.6
The steady worsening of the appellate court picture has not
gone unnoticed. The nonjudicial branches of government and
private groups have registered growing concern to do something
about the existing and foreseeable crisis afflicting the appellate
courts. With reference to the Supreme Court's problems, the best
known response was the formation of the Freund Study Group by
the Federal Judicial Center. Its report 7 has commanded wide
attention and unduly shrill reactions because of one of its
recommendations. 8 Meanwhile, several deservedly acclaimed features of the report have been nearly lost to view.
In 1973, the distinguished Commission on Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System was brought into existence with
the dual function of rewiring the federal circuitry and improving
the appellate courts' structure and procedures.
Finally, mention should be made of the free-lance Advisory
Council for Appellate Justice, which has the active support of the
National Center for State Courts and the Federal Judicial Center.
The Council is working on a wide range of structural, procedural,
and personnel problems to improve appellate justice. Dean Cramton is by common consent one of the outstandingly productive
members of both the Federal Commission and the Advisory Council.
A further word is in order to help lend perspective to what
follows. The phenomenon of mounting case loads is not novel in
this country's experience, either in the state or federal systems. The
problem has been recurrent throughout our national development.
But just as with population and pollution, so here: quantitative
change can at last have vast qualitative impact. The suddenness and
sheer mass of the recent growth in the volume of federal court
5 See DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL

REPORT 108 (Table 15) (FY 1972) [hereinafter cited as A.O. REPORT] (percentage change
of FY 1972 over FY 1960 total criminal and civil filings).
6 Compare DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,

ANNUAL REPORT 210 (Table BI) (FY 1960), with A.O. REPORT 87 (Table 1).
7 STUDY GROUP ON THE CASE LOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,

REPORT (1972).
8 The study group's proposal for a National Court of Appeals has been attacked by
former Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan among others. See Burger & Warren,

Retired ChiefJustice Warren Attacks, ChiefJustice BurgerDefends FreundStudy Group's Composition
and Proposal, 59 A.B.A.J. 721, 724 (1973). See also Brennan, Justice Brennan Calls National
Court of Appeals Proposal "FundamentallyUnnecessary and Ill Advised," 59 A.B.A.J. 835 (1973).
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cases presents an unprecedented threat to the integrity of the
judicial function. A number of observers believe the situation has
the earmarks of the overworked term "emergency." I am one of
these. For that reason it seems right to inspect at closer range some
of the apparent causes and potential consequences of the appeal
explosion our courts are experiencing.
II
CAUSES

For many years after the first quarter of this century the
volume of appealed cases remained relatively stable as the total of
federal trials began to swell. However, as noted, beginning in 1966,
the growth curve for appeals shot steeply upward, producing in
seven years a 117 percent increase in the number of cases filed in
the courts of appeals. 9
The largest single component of the growth was civil rights
litigation. This was of course spurred by the legislation of the
mid-1960's. The result was an increase in the federal district court
intake of these actions from 709 in fiscal year 1964 to over 6,100 in
fiscal year 1972.10 At this time there were also large increases in
traditional spheres, such as labor relations, labor standards, social
security, marine, patent, copyright, and government contract suits.
In the time period we are considering, the volume of appeals
in criminal litigation doubled. Convictions after trial contest rose
from about 2,900 to more than 5,500.11 Prisoner petitions zoomed
from about 7,500 appealable judgments in the 1965 court year to
approximately 15,700 in the 1972 court year.' 2
If other things had been constant, the overall increase in
district court volume would have been reflected in a correspondingly sizeable rise of about fifty-five percent in the number of
appeals.' 3 In fact, the appellate rate climbed more than twice that
rapidly.' 4 Several factors were at work.
With respect to noncriminal matters, the classes of cases that
9 See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
10 See A.O. REPORT 287 (Table C2); DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES
11 See A.O.
UNITED STATES
I2 See A.O.

COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 218 (Table C2) (FY 1964).
REPORT 381 (Table D4); DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 256 (Table D4) (FY 1964).
REPORT 320-23 (Table C4); DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 188-90 (Table C4) (FY 1965).
13 The total of civil and criminal cases filed in federal district courts has risen 55%

between fiscal years 1966 and 1973. See DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 11-21, 11-40 (Tables 16, 32) (FY 1973).
14 See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
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experienced the greatest growth at the district court level were
precisely those that are most productive of appeals-the civil rights
and labor relations cases. In addition, suits of the new breed, such
as environmental and consumer litigation, tend toward complexity.
Thus, adding to their tendency to appeal more voluminously is
their propensity to require judicial energy output far beyond the
"average" case.
Even the old standard types of cases have shown a tendency to
become more appeal-prone. The trend has been manifest since
1960. Its cause is uncertain, but one likely factor is the relative
decrease in the cost of perfecting an appeal-relative to the
amount of money involved.
Not even changing patterns of substantive business account for
the steep rise. For example, appeals of private civil judgments on
the diversity side have risen about thirty percent in the most recent
decade. 15 One searches in vain for changes in the substantive laws
of the states or in the nature of the controversies to furnish an
explanation for this. We are forced to conclude that there simply is
more inclination to appeal a losing judgment, and no sufficient
deterrent in the form of expense, fatigue, or other disincentive.
In criminal proceedings, the appointment of counsel to represent indigent accused persons has powerfully stimulated the rate
of appeal from convictions, boosting it from about twenty-one
percent in 1960 to about fifty-four percent in 1970.16
Restating this message, I would say that the problem of the rise
in the appellate case load in the federal courts has both quantitative
and qualitative dimensions-the former having to do with the
sheer numbers or volume load; the latter, with the amount
of work and stress the appellate judges are burdened with. If
greater volume simply required raising the tempo of energy
consumption-as pressing the car's accelerator a bit harder does-the problem would not be so serious. But in the courts, the
pressure of greater quantity to force speedier dispositions clearly
affects quality-at least, the quality of the process.
Of course, the pressure generated by an increase in dispositions by the courts of appeals is transmitted upward and finds
reflection in a roughly comparable increase in the numbers of
petitions filed in the Supreme Court. Over the last decade the
percentage of appellate court losers seeking further review in the
15 Compare DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
ANNUAL REPORT 196 (Table C2) (FY 1962), with A.O. REPORT 286 (Table C2).
16 Goldman, Federal District Courts and the Appellate Crisis, 57 JUDICATURE 211, 212

(1973),,
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Supreme Court has remained constant at between sixteen to nineteen percent. 17 Also constant has been the total number of petitions
granted by the Supreme Court. This means that the percentage of
court of appeals dispositions experiencing Supreme Court review
has steadily declined and is now well below one percent. In
ninety-nine percent or more of their decisions, the courts of appeals are effectively the courts of last resort.
In addition to the growth in federal court petitions, the
number of petitions coming to the Supreme Court from the
highest state courts has also increased substantially. Overall, the
number of petitions and appeals from all sources has risen over the
past decade from about 2,400 to more than 3,700.18
True, all these figures must be used with caution because cases
present individualistic problems that are not accurately measured
in volume figures alone. Many involve relatively simple issues of
sufficiency of evidence to sustain guilty verdicts in criminal cases,
or insubstantial collateral attacks upon old convictions. Others are
complex and time-consuming. That makes the nature of the cases
being appealed a critical factor.
Yet after due allowance is made, the fact remains that the
machine-gun rapidity with which the Supreme Court Justices are
fired upon by certiorari-seeking litigants is dangerous-not so
much for the personnel as for the institution. It is not a matter of
whether the Justices have more leisure or less leisure for their
personal pursuits. One Justice recently put it that the inevitable
result of having to decide which of eighty new matters a week to
hear and decide is that the litigants and their causes cannot possibly
always receive the care which they deserve. Continuing, he observed that the threat is to the work of the Court as an institution.
He does not view its importance in terms of effect on the Justices.
He said he himself would work just as long and as hard if the

Court's docket were cut in half. His concern is for the quality of the
product.19
III
OPrIONS

As the number of litigants seeking to use the federal appellate
courts rises sharply, the court structure and processes must change
in one way or another.
17

See H.

"I See

FRIENDLY,

DIRECTOR OF

FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
THE

ADMINISTRATIVE

A

GENERAL VIEw

OFFICE OF

THE

48 n.165 (1973).

UNITED

STATES

COURTS,

178 (Table Al) (FY 1973) (figure for Oct. Term 1962); Supreme Court of
the United States, Office of the Clerk, October Term 1972 Statistical Sheet No. 28 (Final),
June 29, 1973.
19 See Burger & Warren, supra note 8, at 723.
ANNUAL REPORT
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A possible course is to clamp a ceiling on the number of
appeals that are allowed. This expedient entails as a cost surrendering the opportunity to correct a certain proportion of wrong or
aberrant decisions that trial courts render from time to time. Fewer
decisions reviewed virtually guarantees fewer errors corrected.
Another course-assuming that volume continues to swell, the
judge complement stays constant, and the number of appeals is not
restricted by reducing the loser's opportunity to seek review of trial
decisions-is to introduce procedural changes in the appeal courts.
For example, limits may be placed upon the parties' opportunity to
make oral arguments. Fewer arguments, shorter ones, or both, may
be decreed. Screening devices can be used to sift out appeals that
appear to have little merit. A screening committee of one or two
judges may be asked to weed out "insubstantial" appeals by rendering summary decisions at the threshold. This avoids employing the
full three-judge panel, with obvious economy in judicial effort.
But even if these speed-up measures do achieve an increased
rate of disposition, it will be at the cost of changing the nature of
the process. There will be less personal contact between judges and
cases, more delegation to unseen aides, and less sharply defined
responsibility in the judges themselves. The endeavor will probably
lose ground in its effort to retain the sense that adjudication is a
human and personal experience.
A third option is the obvious one of keeping abreast of
increasing workload by augmenting the number of judges. However, this entails the risk of lessening the relative stature and,
possibly, power of the position of the court of appeals judge.
Justice' Frankfurter foresaw risks of this kind when he wrote: "[A]
steady increase in judges does not alleviate; in my judgment, it is
bound to depreciate the quality of the federal judiciary and thereby
adversely to affect the whole system. '2 0 The "depreciation of the
judicial currency," he continued, leads to a "consequent impair2
ment of the prestige and of the efficacy" of the courts. 1

Not all agree that a densely populated bench necessarily sags
in its status. But nearly all would have to agree that enlarging the
chorus of judicial voices engaged in announcing the law greatly
augments the chances of contradictory and-confusing signals as to
what the law is. There is no ready corrective for this tendency, as is
shown by the experience of the bloated Fifth Circuit. To introduce
20

Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,

concurring).
21 Id.
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an overall and singular declaration of the law on especially divisive
issues, the fifteen members of that court must sit en banc. Aside
from the indifferent success of such full-bench panels in settling
the point at issue -if the fifteen judges divide sharply, the
inefficiency of the practice is staggering. For the occasion, a large
group of judges must travel to a single situs from all across the
South. The result is to immobilize as many as five panels at one
stroke while the judges are traveling, hearing argument, and conferring.
All the remedial alternatives, separately or in combination, are
in some measure distasteful, but the most dangerously seductive
one is the expansion of the number of judgeships. The pressure
toward continual enlargement must constantly be guarded against.
For the reasons given-to avoid dilution of status, cacophony in
enunciation of the law, and the inefficiencies of oversized complements in a single circuit court-my view is that the principle of "the
smaller, the better" is a sound working axiom for federal circuit
courts of appeals.
Recognizing that our options are limited, we face the task of
choosing the least distasteful blend of arrangements we can achieve
in order to cope effectively with an unpredictable, generally increasing demand for the services of those courts. Which blend is
least obnoxious depends on our values and priorities with regard to
a recognized list of desired or detested attributes of appellate
review. These warrant our scrutiny.
IV
JUDICIAL ADAPTATION

Many observers see congestion primarily as a threat to the
tradition of personal responsibility of the appellate judges for the
fairness and correctness of individual decisions. The primary and
universal, although not exclusive, function of appellate litigation is
to protect litigants from the misuse of power by trial courts and
administrative agencies by subjecting their decisions to review. An
important by-product of this function is that it paradoxically reinforces and enhances the power of the reviewed officials, for it
raises the litigant's and the public's confidence that the judges of
first instance were motivated to decide correctly.
The appellate courts of the United States have performed this
universal function of review with unusual success. This may, in
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part, be due to a number of features of the traditional process
which serve to assure litigants that their grievances have been fully
and fairly considered. Among these are that: (1) each disappointed
litigant has been assured an opportunity to confront his adversary
in oral argument on appeal; (2) the argument has been conducted
before a tribunal composed of at least three estimable and independent judges; (3) the judges who decide are generally expected
to explain their decisions in sufficient detail to withstand public
inspection in the official reports of their proceedings; and (4) each
disappointed litigant has been assured an opportunity to address
the Supreme Court.
Each of these traditional features has been impaired by the
congestion of the past decade. In order to avoid wholly unacceptable delays, the courts have modified substantial aspects of the
process envisioned by the traditional expectations in the following
manner: (1) oral argument has been abbreviated and sometimes
eliminated in the courts of appeals; (2) the regular three-person
decisional mechanism of circuit judges has been modified by reducing the panel size to two judges, or by bringing up trial judges ad
hoc to engage in appellate work; (3) the judges have increasingly
relied on the staff work done by their youthful law clerks or other
rapidly rotating staff assistants; (4) many decisions are not published; some are not explained in a reasoned written statement of
any kind; an increasing fraction are the subject of terse oral
dispositions such as "affirmed" or "dismissed"; (5) the amount of
attention given by the individual Justices to the petitions of individual litigants seeking to be heard in the highest court has been
reduced to the vanishing point. These petitions are now received in
such numbers-about eighty each week in the year, on average
-that they can be expeditiously handled only by means of heavy
reliance on the work of staff of low visibility. Continuation of this
tendency risks eroding confidence. Visibility is a substantial requisite for justice since, in the well-worn phrase, it must be seen as well
as done. Nonvisibility properly enters the traditional judicial process only at the stage when the known officials deliberate-not to
mask the identity of the individuals who do the deciding.
V
GoALs
The task is to develop a plan which heeds a number of
injunctions rooted in convictions that are as widely shared as
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possible. Because of the fragile quality of efforts at court reform,
even modest opposition can be fatal; and opposition seems certain
to come forth against any plan violating the following constraints.
To be acceptable a plan should:
A.

Preserve Channels of Access to the Supreme Court for All Citizens
Whether vain or improbable, the hope must be allowed to
flicker that every person has a right to approach the Supreme
Court for redress. This imperative does not require that all Justices
actually read and pass upon each and every petition, as long as the
channel to the Justices remains visibly open.
B. Preserve the Supreme Court's Control
The public apparently holds the Court in awe, whether or not
universally in esteem. It opposes "tampering" with the Court.
Among those who help shape the public's reaction, some attach
great importance to the phrase of the Constitution which commits
the federal judicial power to "one supreme Court." Although those
who embrace this phrase as a credo agree it does not require the
Court to exercise direct authority over each decision in each case,
they insist it does require the Court to retain general control over
all subordinate institutions.
C.

Give Equal Treatment to Criminal Appeals
Persons accused or convicted of a crime must be given the level
of consideration and procedural opportunity open to civil litigants.
This does not require that the treatment of civil and criminal cases
be precisely the same. It does imply that any plan that sets up a
court to hear solely criminal appeals will be regarded with suspicion if it appears to stamp criminal cases as requiring only secondclass treatment.
D. Preserve the Dignity of Lower Courts
Although some observers disagree, many are convinced of the
importance to our system of maintaining a highly esteemed corps
of federal judges who find challenge and fulfillment in their work.
Even to those who do not share this View, it must be clear that
powerful resistance will be aroused by any changes which demean
federal judges by lessening their responsibilities, making their work
dull, bureaucratic, or inconsequential, or vastly expanding their
numbers. The risk of debasing the currency of judicial office does
not require placing a freeze on the number of judgeships, but it
does suggest parsimony in creating new judgeships.
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E. Not Elongate the Appellate Process
Any revamping of the federal judicial hierarchy must be
designed to avoid multiplicity of appeals. It will be most difficult to
justify a revision which exposes litigants to the costs, tensions, and
other burdens of an additional level of review.
F. Avoid JurisdictionalBickering
Few legal disputes are less productive than those over whether
this court or another is the appropriate one to decide an issue. Any
revision should minimize jurisdictional disputes, not generate
them.
G. Avoid Specialization of Appellate Judges
An appellate judge should not be assigned duties so narrow
that they will repel the ablest judges, or foster a narrow, slit-viewed
approach. Moreover, new judicial posts should be furnished
safeguards against efforts of special interests to control the process
of selecting the judges.
VI
FLEXIBILITY

Besides observing the constraints just outlined, a workable
plan for revising federal appellate structures and procedures must
have the support of the Justices of the Supreme Court-or, at least,
must avoid their opposition. This complicates our task because not
all the Justices have stated their views (to say nothing of their votes)
on several pivotal matters that will make or break any plan affecting the Court's work. Even-'if their views were expressed, a court
plan should not be hewn in granite, for the Justices' attitudes are
subject to revision as experience unfolds and, of course, the membership of the Court will change. These considerations underline
the unwisdom of inflexible "solutions." The same concerns argue
against adoption of measures to expand lower court judgeships or
alter structures by measures that would be hard to recall. A
strategy that allows maximum responsiveness not only to presently
perceived but to inevitably changing needs seems essential. If
flexibility is built into the program, any faulty move can be swiftly
corrected.
A flexible approach is exemplified in the well-known and
well-used legislation which enables the Supreme Court to make
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rules of procedure. The Rules Enabling Act of 193422 is the
primary antecedent; it authorizes the Court to promulgate rules
which are subject to congressional disapproval within a specified
period.
In the present context, because of the extraordinary importance of the stakes, it is neither wise nor appropriate for Congress
to make an open-ended delegation of power over judicial structure
and organization, even if there is provision for congressional disapproval. The area within which delegated power to revise structures and procedures may be exercised must be clearly delineated.
This power might be assigned to the Supreme Court in the manner
of the Enabling Act, perhaps assisted by a standing commission.
Additional flexibility can be achieved through the use of creative methods of court administration. Differential treatment of
cases which make differing demands on the diverse functions of
appellate courts is possible by utilizing advanced methods of
administration. As an example, some state courts have developed
effective new means of utilizing professional appellate staffs to
reduce administrative burdens on the judges.
Without converting the courts into bureaucracies, the possibility exists that the services of appellate commissioners can be
utilized to relieve judges in ways that avoid doing violence to
cherished values. Appellate courts can certainly make more effective use of data-retrieval technology to provide better information
on which to base the sorting or screening of cases.
Congress must have a role in the flexible program that is
urged here. The congressional role should come into play at both
ends of the process: at the start, by constructing the basic
framework of the revised court structure; at the end, by approving
or disapproving the Supreme Court's exercise of its rule-making
power in the course of conferring or retrieving jurisdiction in the
way it sees the need to do.
VII
ACHIEVING

GOALS AND MEETING NEEDS

There follows an abbreviated version of one model of a group
of proposals for a revamped intermediate federal court system that
is due for consideration by the Advisory Council for Appellate
Justice. The point to underline is that this model has not yet been
discussed or approved in its specifics by the Council.
22 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:576

This plan for revision of the federal appellate court system
tries to respond to four needs: (1) to improve the course of
appellate review in criminal cases in order to make the final
resolution of these cases a more civilized and rational process than
it is now; (2) to harmonize and unify national law in particular
subject areas which the United States Supreme Court for quite
understandable reasons has not been able to address and settle by
rendering authoritative decisions; (3) to provide the courts of
appeals with the structure, personnel, other resources, and procedures to enable them to function without the frenetic rush-rush
tempo that frustrates the desired personal quality in the review
process; and (4) to enable the courts of appeals to aid the Supreme
Court in the discharge of its functions, while preserving channels
of access to the high court.
Meeting these needs involves creating a capability in the intermediate appellate court system to do the assigned tasks by
several means. First is the need to improve the handling of criminal
cases. This requires investing in federal judges under the control of
the Supreme Court the power and affirmative duty to assure that
safeguards guaranteed criminally accused persons by the United
States Constitution have been observed and their claims resolved in
accordance with the law. As to claims readily raised and fairly
reviewed, repetitious collateral attacks can then be foreclosed. With
the aid of congressional legislation and within constitutional limits,
finality through res judicata will be revitalized in criminal cases.
Second is the need to improve the system's capacity to enunciate a unified and harmonious national corpus juris in particularly
active fields of law. The intermediate federal appellate court system
could do this in areas committed to it by the Supreme Court
pursuant to congressional authorization. An intermediate court's
decisions would be recommendations, not automatically definitive
pronouncements.
#
Third is the task of enhancing the personal quality of review
and avoiding mass production-assembly line methods of dispensing
justice to a case load of great bulk. This requires either reducing
the number of cases or increasing the number ofjudges working at
the intermediate level.
As I noted earlier, the possibilities of reducing the intake of
cases into the federal system have been thoroughly canvassed by
Judge Friendly. The reductions he has proposed will buy time, but
in my view will not preserve for long the functional integrity of the
system unless other measures are taken. As we have seen, the

1974]

FEDERAL APPELLATE JUSTICE

problem at the appellate level is more serious than a mere
reflection of the burgeoning number of district court entries.
Appeals are increasing at double or triple the rate of the district
courts' increase in volume.
A potential way of achieving a reduction in appellate case load
is to provide disincentives to appealing. Without violating the
tradition that the right of appeal should be generously accessible,
serious attention must be given to the question of how would-be
appellants can be required to risk something of value as a condition
for bringing on appeals wholly lacking in substance. This must be
done consistently with due process and fairness.
To aid the Supreme Court in the task of selecting cases for
review, the intermediate appellate court need not be given final
dispositive power to grant or deny certiorari. A division of a
reorganized intermediate court of appeals could aid the Supreme
Court in its screening function, not by dispatching 400 to 500 cases
and rejecting finally the remaining 3,200 or so petitions as suggested by the Freund Study Group. Rather, the intermediate court
should be empowered to send forward all petitions after formulating carefully the questions presented by the petitioner and stating
its recommendations to grant or deny a hearing before the Supreme Court, with reasons.
To achieve some of the values we seek, we shall have to
increase the number of judges at the court of appeals level. There
are now not quite one hundred authorized. An increase of not
more than twenty to twenty-five judgeships could be made without
unacceptable risk to the status of the office in the sense which
aroused the concern of Mr. Justice Frankfurter.

VIII
A

FLEXIBLE MODEL

The implementation of this model of a program for a new
approach to meeting the appellate system's needs calls for action by
both Congress and the Supreme Court. The plan set out here-for
illustrative purposes-features a capacity for flexible response to
developing needs. Its essential elements are outlined below.
A.

Consolidation

Congress by statute consolidates the existing courts of appeals
into a unified administrative and jurisdictional system. The unified

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:576

entity is called the Court of Appeals of the United States. It merges
the eleven existing courts of appeals and erases existing circuit
boundaries.
B.

Divisions of the New Court of Appeals
Congress provides that the Court of Appeals of the United
States will consist of a Central Division, a Circuit Division, a Claims
Division, and a Customs and Patents Division. The two last-named
divisions would carry forward substantially intact the duties of the
courts they replace. The Circuit Division is to be divided into as
many circuits as appears desirable, giving due recognition to the
need to avoid disruption of existing geographic and political arrangements except for good cause. Creating smaller and more
numerous circuits raises problems, both political and judicial. Considering the urgency, I think they will be resolved acceptably
though not perfectly. The courts in the redrawn circuits carry out
their present functions, with this important exception: they do not
perform any functions assigned to the Central Division.
C. The Central Division
Congress prescribes the basic structure of the Central Division,
partitioning it into four chambers or sections. Within defined limits
the Supreme Court, under a Rules Enabling Act, sets procedures
and gives or withdraws jurisdiction. The following will be the
congressionally created sections:
1. Section for Criminal Appeals
First is a Section for Criminal Appeals, charged with the duty
to grant a searching review in appeals from the highest court of a
state or a federal circuit court of appeals affirming a criminal
judgment. The purpose is to assure that the defendants federally
secured rights to counsel, freedom from illegal search, arrest,
line-up, etc., have been protected. The consequence of the Criminal Appeals section's searching review is to foreclose most issues
from collateral attack after assuring that due process has been
accorded to the defendant.
This plan presupposes congressional legislation which
"res-judicatifies" issues previously heard or disclaimed in an approved and opportune fashion by the court system rendering the
criminal judgment. A panel of five or seven Court of Appeals
judges, assigned to the Central Division from among qualified
sitting judges of the unified court, for three years (or four or five),
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and subject to rotation among the sections, would staff the
chamber dealing with criminal appeals.
2. Section for National Law Specialties
Another panel of judges will function in a Section for National
Law Specialties. All cases falling within specified categories
or classes of suit will go to this section. The categories will be drawn
from a Chinese-menu style list, prepared by Congress and naming
such federal specialties as labor relations, social security, environmental protection, antitrust, or whatever fields the Supreme Court
regards as most in need of unifying, harmonizing decisions.
Here we come to a key feature of the plan. It is the Supreme
Court that determines which three or so classes of cases on the
congressional list are most in need of submission to the panel
constituting the Section for National Law Specialties. Appeals in
the selected categories go directly to this section from the district
court or the administrative agency, bypassing the circuit court. The
decisions of the section panel in turn go to the Supreme Court as
recommended decisions for nationwide applicability.. For a sixty-day
period after the filing of the section's recommended decision the
high court has the option to set each of these cases on its own
docket. If the Supreme Court declines to do so, the decision
becomes final and binding throughout the nation. This ends intercircuit conflicts and other types of indeterminacy about that issue,
as if the Supreme Court itself had spoken.
Two further points are to be stressed. First, Congress, by
appropriate legislation, invests the Supreme Court with the described powers. The main enabling statute is one modeled on
section 2072 of Title 28 of the United States Code, which is the
basis of the Supreme Court's long-standing power to make rules of
procedure for the district courts.
Second, the Supreme Court's exercise of its powers under the
proposed Enabling Act is subject to the present type of formal
approval or disapproval by Congress. This will also hold true for
other types of powers granted to the Supreme Court under this
proposal. The Court may recall and reinstate any jurisdiction
granted to a section of the Central Division as demands slacken or
quicken, and as experience shows what works well and what does
not.
This is the essence of the concept of planned flexibility. The
Supreme Court has its hand on the throttle or the valve
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-determining when classes of cases or particular functions shall
flow into and out of the Central Division.
3. Section for Certiorari Review
Another section of the Central Division can be authorized to
perform a limited kind of sifting of petitions to the Supreme Court
for certiorari and then to recommend the grant or denial of the
writ. Unlike the Freund Study Group's plan, this proposal does not
contemplate that the screening panel will have or exercise final
power to grant or deny any petition.
Instead, it would forward all four thousand (or whatever the
total number) of the certiorari petitions to the Supreme Court, in
each case stating in summary fashion the issues presented, recommending grant or denial of the petition, and outlining its
reasons in the briefest space consistent with clarity. Passage of time
(e.g., sixty days) without action by the Justices would give the
Central Division's recommendation the stamp of Supreme Court
approval.
A recurring question is whether a losing litigant will be permitted to attack recommendations of the Central Division that are
transmitted to the Supreme Court. In my view, the answer should
be a qualified yes. Under the rules the Supreme Court will promulgate to govern petitions and other documents submitted to it,
provision can be made that only the papers submitted to the
Central Division, the recommended decision of the relevant section
of that court, plus a brief motion for rehearing, which succinctly
notes the alleged points of error in the decision, will be presented
by a petitioner to the Supreme Court.
4. Section for Referred Cases
The fourth and final chamber of the Central Division might
serve as what has been dubbed a "court of exit" to hear cases the
Supreme Court refers to it on an individual rather than categorical
basis. These would be cases the Justices believe need decision at the
highest level, but as to which they prefer a preliminary decision to
be made by the Central Division and transmitted to the Supreme
Court with a recommendation. In my scale of priorities, this
referral section has only marginal utility compared to the other
three chambers.
D. Selection of Judges
Selecting judges for the Central Division is doubtless a crucial
matter. Both Congress and the President, as well as the Supreme
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Court, will take a close look at this feature of the plan before
approving it. Still, the problem of how to select the judges can
more readily be resolved when the Central Division's functions and
procedures are more sharply defined. The manner of selecting
judges, including by whom or what combination of officials, is not
simple; but it is soluble and should be deferred for now.
An estimated twenty or so new judges will be required if most
of the duties outlined here are placed in the Central Division.
There are logistical problems involved in the replacement of Central Division judges in their "home circuits" while they are assigned
to their special duties. Their personal and financial circumstances
will be disrupted if they must sit intermittently for short periods
away from home in various Central. Division headquarters
cities-for example, New York or Washington; New Orleans or
Houston; Los Angeles or San Francisco; St. Louis or Chicago. This
problem is also difficult, but also soluble in my judgment.
E.

Flexibility
The flexibility motif is carried through extensively in this
proposal, as is apparent. Some may complain the plan is so elastic it
is formless. Even if that criticism has some merit, like others it can
be met.

CONCLUSION

The flexible approach outlined here-particularly creation of
the Central Division-is believed to meet the chief needs of the
federal system, not alone as they appear today, but as they may
develop. These are: (1) to "res-judicatify" claims of violation of
criminal procedural Safeguards, thereby reducing the inane
stretch-out and repetition that unchecked collateral attacks now
permit; (2) to unify and harmonize national law in areas where it is
splintered or undeterminable; (3) to aid the Supreme Court in
coping with its problem of dealing with an ever-rising tide of
certiorari petitions; and (4) to serve as a referral court for the
Supreme Court in appropriate individual cases.
By attempting those tasks, the system can remain responsive to
changing needs. The Supreme Court can open or close the sluice
gates to direct the flow of work as it finds needful. If it wishes, it
can drain jurisdiction from inefficacious chambers of the Central
Division and reassign their personnel.
In this plan, two features of the Freund Study Group's proposals that caused widespread anxiety are dealt with head-on. The
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Supreme Court remains in control of its docket. The channel of
access to the Supreme Court-whether a reality or an illusion
today-is not blocked by final action of a lower court.
As for the court of appeals judges who will serve in the Central
Division, they are given work of consequence and variety. Both
their interest and dignity are preserved.
To be sure, this plan has bugs. Exterminating them will be a
lively enterprise. But, in truth, I believe it is worth the effort and
that the effort will succeed.

